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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
Physician Hospitals of America (“PHA”) is a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) organization formed
to educate members of the physician-owned hospital community about regulatory and legislative
issues and to encourage PHA members to advocate for the rights of physician-owned hospitals.
PHA has approximately 166 member hospitals in 34 different states, comprising both existing
facilities and physician-owned hospitals in various stages of development. PHA member
hospitals are typically enrolled as providers under Medicare and Medicaid programs, with up to
70% of their case mix stemming from Medicare and Medicaid patients. The physician owners of
PHA member hospitals are also providers under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
PHA is committed to the sanctity of private property as guaranteed by the Constitution,
especially in relation to the rights of physicians to own and operate hospitals and to provide
patients with expert, cost-effective, and efficient health care. In Physician Hospitals of America,
et al. v. Sebelius, Case No. 6:10-cv-00277-MHS, filed June 3, 2010, in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division, PHA, along with a member hospital, is challenging
the constitutionality of § 6001 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(“PPACA”), which singles out for negative treatment physician-owned hospitals from among all
those owned by persons of any other profession. Section 6001 retroactively prohibits planned,
approved, and commenced service facility expansion at approximately 58 Medicare-certified
hospitals solely because they are owned by physicians, and further prevents the development of
an additional 84 physician-owned hospitals that would be otherwise eligible for Medicare
certification.

1
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PHA has an interest in protecting its members directly, and the public indirectly, from
any unconstitutional healthcare legislation, and thus it has an interest in supporting the
Commonwealth of Virginia in this action.
In the following memorandum, PHA addresses the merits of the Commonwealth’s case
and in particular the dubious constitutional bases asserted by the Secretary in an attempt to have
the Court sustain § 1501 of the PPACA, which requires American citizens who are not already
insured to purchase health insurance coverage. PHA urges the Court to grant summary judgment
for the Commonwealth and to enjoin enforcement of the PPACA in its entirety.

2
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW
I.

The PPACA’s Individual Mandate to Purchase Insurance Is An Unprecedented and
Unconstitutional Extension of Federal Power Beyond Congress’s Authority To
Regulate Interstate Commerce
As noted by the Court, this action turns on the narrow question of “whether or not

Congress has the power to regulate—and tax—a citizen’s decision not to participate in interstate
commerce.” Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (E.D. Va. 2010).
As the Court rightly observed, “no reported case from any federal appellate court has extended
the Commerce Clause or Tax Clause to include the regulation of a person’s decision not to
purchase a product, notwithstanding its effect on interstate commerce.” Id.
In her response to Virginia’s motion for summary judgment, the Secretary sidesteps the
central question, suggesting instead that this particular area of commerce, the market for health
care services, is somehow sui generis. According to the Secretary, this market, as she defines it,
is unique because an individual cannot decline to participate in it:
No person can guarantee that he will divorce himself entirely
from the market for health care services. The health care market
is distinctive in this respect. Because the minimum coverage
provision regulates the means of payment in a market in which all
are participants, the Congressional power to enact it does not in
any way imply a power to require individuals to participate in
other markets or to take any other action.
(Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Pl.’s. Mot. Summ. J. 1) (emphasis added).
The Secretary argues that since most Americans will eventually participate in the health
care services market, they can justifiably be shanghaied into participating now. Yet there is
nothing unique regarding the size or economic significance of the health care services market. It
is much the same as the markets for other essential goods and services such as food, clothing,
housing and transportation. Most Virginians will participate in these markets, to one degree or

3

Case 3:10-cv-00188-HEH Document 122

Filed 10/04/10 Page 7 of 15

another, throughout their lives.1 Yet no one would suggest that Congress has unlimited authority
under the Commerce Clause to mandate the individual purchase of particular food, clothing,
housing or transportation products.
Moreover, to make her point, the Secretary engages in a rhetorical shell game, redefining
and enlarging the scope of commerce implicated by the health insurance mandate. This suit
however, involves only the relatively narrow market for health care insurance, not some broad,
amorphous market for health care services. For many Virginians, participation in the latter
simply does not require participation in the former, and indeed, the Secretary concedes that
numerous Americans have elected not to purchase health insurance because they do not believe
that, in their particular situations, the product is worth its cost. The Secretary tries to save the
mandate by insisting that these same Americans must eventually purchase health care services of
some kind. Based on this expected participation in a broader health care services market at a
later time, the Secretary believes that all Virginians can be made to engage in a narrower health
insurance market today.
Were the Secretary’s rationale to succeed, there would no longer be any limit on
Congress’s use of the Commerce Clause to regulate private conduct. Rather, Congress would be
empowered to regulate not only those engaged in interstate commerce, but also those who are
anticipated to participate in commerce. If Congress can force anyone it deems a potential
entrant into a market to actually enter and purchase goods and services—on pain of a monetary
penalty—then there truly is no limit to Congress’s power. The Tenth Amendment—and even
federalism itself—has become a nullity.
1

Of course the popular media frequently reports, anecdotally, on individuals who have lived to
old age without ever requiring any health care services; and tragically many Virginians die
accidental deaths at young ages without having required health care services.

4
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Fortunately, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that there are actual limits on
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. “[E]ven under our modern, expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, Congress’ regulatory authority is not without effective
bounds.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
While it is undoubtedly true that the Congress’s Commerce power has grown far beyond
the conception of the Framers, see, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court has
clearly prescribed its limits. As characterized in Lopez, Congress may regulate only the use of
the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce; and activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). However, even if an exercise of the
Commerce power might otherwise fall within this description, the Court has rejected any
interpretation of the Commerce power which would transform it into a boundless police power.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
Here, the mandate does not fall within the permissible range of regulation under the
Commerce Clause. A present-day decision to decline to purchase health insurance does not
affect or embody the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Uninsured
individuals are purposefully not participating in the health insurance market by choice. The
issue of whether these same individuals may someday be in the market for other health care
services is irrelevant to the Commerce Clause analysis. While Congress can regulate activities
substantially affecting interstate commerce, no case has ever recognized the extension of
Congressional authority to inactivity. If a citizen chooses to participate in the market for health
insurance in the future, that participation may then be subject to regulation. But it remains a

5
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citizen’s prerogative to make that affirmative choice, not for Congress to make the choice for
him.
The Secretary proposes that Congress’s commerce power have no limit. Under her
theory, Congress could subject individuals to its regulatory schemes on the pretext that they are
potential participants in some amorphous market, subjecting them to whatever compulsions it
can devise. As expressed by the Supreme Court in Lopez, “if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.” 514 U.S. at 564.
II.

The Mandate to Purchase Insurance is Not a Valid Exercise of the Taxing Power.
The Secretary has argued in the alternative that if the mandate to purchase insurance is

not a valid exercise of the Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, it is nonetheless a
constitutionally permissible exercise of the taxing power. (Def.’s Mem. Opp’n to Pl.’s. Mot.
Summ. J. 19, et seq.) This argument is similarly unavailing.
First, the health insurance mandate cannot be saved as an exercise of the taxing power
because Congress did not intend to exercise that power when it enacted the mandate. The
Supreme Court has held that Congress is entitled to deference from the courts with respect to
which of its powers it purports to exercise. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
Here, not only does the PPACA expressly define the mandate to be an exercise of the commerce
power, but the legislative history conclusively demonstrates that Congress considered and
rejected the use of the taxing power.
The tortured legislative process which resulted in the enactment of the PPACA was much
documented in the media. The passage of the legislation favored by the House of
Representatives was derailed by the election of Senator Scott Brown—resulting in the House’s

6
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passage of the Senate Bill. The unsuccessful House Bill, designated as H.R. 3962, contained
language similar to § 1501 of the PPACA. It too included a mandate to purchase insurance. A
key difference, however, is that H.R. 3962 explicitly claimed to exercise Congress’s taxing
power in order to compel individuals to purchase insurance:
In the case of any individual who does not meet the requirements of
subsection (d) at any time during the taxable year, there is hereby imposed
a tax equal to 2.5 percent of the excess of— (1) the taxpayers modified
adjusted gross income for the taxable year, over (2) the amount of gross
income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with respect to the taxpayer.
H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009) (emphasis added). That language was excluded from the bill
that passed the Senate.
The Secretary makes much in her brief about the democratic process, arguing that this
Court should refrain from exercising its own authority under the Constitution out of deference
for the elected branches. Here, however, the same deference to the legislative process would
appear to cut off any assertion that the mandate is an exercise of the taxing power. The elected
branch of government of which the Secretary is so considerate specifically contemplated
exercising its taxing power to enforce the mandate, but rejected doing so. Instead, Congress
attempted to exercise is power under the Commerce Clause—an attempt which, as described
above, impermissibly overstepped the bounds of the power granted by that clause.
However, even if the Court allowed the Secretary to succeed in her counter-factual
recharacterization of the mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, the mandate still fails. The
Supreme Court held in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922),
that Congress cannot evade the bounds placed on its powers by the Tenth Amendment through
the mere semantic manipulation of calling a penalty a tax. In the words of Chief Justice Taft:
“To give such magic to the word ‘tax’ would be to break down all constitutional limitation of

7
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the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States.” Id. at 38.
Further, “[w]here the sovereign enacting the law has power to impose both tax and penalty the
difference between revenue production may be immaterial, but not so when one sovereign can
impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests in another.” Id. Here, while Congress has a
broad power to lay and collect taxes for the purpose of raising revenue, the plenary police power
required to lawfully enact the mandate to purchase insurance rests with the states.
To be a valid tax, “the provisions of the so-called taxing act must be naturally and
reasonably adapted to the collection of the tax and not solely to the achievement of some other
purpose plainly within state power.” Id. at 43. The mandate to purchase insurance fails this test.
As the Commonwealth aptly points out, if the mandate works as intended, no revenue will in fact
be collected. The supposed excise is exacted only upon a class of citizens who decline to follow
a prescribed course of conduct. It is thus particularly ill suited for the collection of revenue and
cannot be sustained under the taxing power.
The Secretary asserts in her brief that the Child Labor Tax case is no longer good law in
light of Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). Although the Court in the Child
Labor Tax Case had struck down a putative tax as an unconstitutional regulation, a similar claim
failed in Bob Jones because, unlike in the Child Labor Tax Case, the plaintiffs there filed a
prospective action to prevent enforcement of the tax, rather than a retrospective action for
redress. Id. at 740-41. If in fact Bob Jones is to have any bearing on the holding of the Child
Labor Tax Case at all, it is a favorable one, since the Bob Jones Court cites that case with
approval. See 416 U.S. at 740-41. Nevertheless, the Secretary hangs her hat on a footnote in
Bob Jones which speculates whether distinctions between revenue-raising and regulatory taxes
have been abandoned. Id. at 741 n.12. In the footnote, the Court referred to Sonzinsky v. United

8
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States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937), and did not refer to the Child Labor Tax Case at all. The
holding of Sonzinsky, of course, did not overrule the Child Labor Tax Case, but merely limited it
by pointing out that “an act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing
power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict the thing taxed.”
300 U.S. at 513. In fact, Sonzinsky specifically preserved the holding of the Child Labor Tax
Case:
This case is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related
to a purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other
cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing
regulations. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20.
300 U.S. at 513. Thus there is no credence to the Secretary’s claim that the Child Labor Tax
Case is no longer good law. Absent the rule of the Child Labor Tax Case, the taxing power
would become a de facto police power.
The mandate to purchase insurance does not on its face even purport to be a tax. Even if
it did, the fact that it is not designed to raise revenue but merely to regulate would be necessarily
fatal to any attempt to sustain its validity under Congress’s taxing power.
III.

The Court Should Enjoin Enforcement of the PPACA in its Entirety.
As the Secretary correctly notes, the PPACA is a comprehensive statute that addresses a

wide variety of issues. Many, if not most, of the Act’s substantive effects, however, are in the
realm of health insurance reform, of which the health insurance mandate is an essential element.
The Secretary concedes that these reforms—such as guaranteed-issue and community-rating—
cannot be severed from the minimum coverage provision. However, it is less clear what other
sections contained in PPACA’s hundreds of pages are truly independent of the minimum
coverage requirement.

9
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Astonishingly, the Secretary proposes that this Court should—at a later date—undertake
a “serious severability analysis” of mammoth proportions by separately examining every
provision of PPACA’s 10 titles, which includes 59 subtitles and more than 450 sections. The
proper role of the Court is not to make an individual determination about the desirability of every
provision of PPACA in light of the excision of § 1501. The judicial branch is not charged with
straining to “rewrite” a legislature’s law in a futile attempt to salvage it. Virginia v. Am.
Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). Such analysis and parsing of language is
“quintessentially legislative” and effectively “substitute[s] the judicial for the legislative part of
the government.” Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (quoting United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)). Accordingly, the Court should declare the PPACA
stricken in its entirety and enter an injunction against its enforcement.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the requirement of § 1501 of the PPACA that individual citizens
purchase health insurance or be subject to a monetary penalty is unconstitutional. PHA therefore
requests this Court to grant the Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment and deny
Secretary Sebelius’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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